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Most historians of the electorate in the period between 1688 and 
1832 divide English borough franchises into four types. These 
were: ‘corporation’ boroughs, where the franchise was restricted to 
members of the corporation only; ‘burgage’ boroughs, where voting 
rights were vested in a number of enfranchised properties and 
their holders; ‘inhabitant’ boroughs, where voting rights were held 
by some or all of the ratepayers or householders; and ‘freeman’ 
boroughs, where the franchise was tied to rights of freedom.1 In 
total, there were just over 200 enfranchised boroughs in the 
period, supplying over two-thirds of all the MPs in Parliament.2
Of these types, the first two have been depicted as the most 
venal, most open to corruption, as places where, as O’Gorman 
remarks, ‘some of the worst abuses of the unreformed electoral 
system are to be found’.3 They exemplified J.H. Plumb’s eighteenth-
century drift to oligarchy, so that in 1761 only fifteen proceeded to 
a poll, compared to the sixty that had done so in the stormy 
elections of the 1690s.4 Phillips concurred, judging that they ‘failed 
to be sufficiently active politically to warrant attention’, despite his 
depiction of the limits of patronage among the unruly urban 
electorates of the period. Even so, Dickinson and O’Gorman both 
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stressed that while small electorates and burgage franchises 
undoubtedly favoured wealthy ‘patrons’, such elections still had to 
be managed. Dickinson emphasised that electoral success required 
patrons to spend ‘considerable time, energy and money on the task 
of influencing voters’.5 O’Gorman highlighted local knowledge and 
preparation, since ‘successful electioneering in these boroughs 
demanded the closest attention to local, customary practices whose 
precedents collectively amounted to electoral law’.6
The smaller boroughs emphasise the paradox of much 
eighteenth-century historiography. On the one hand, they appear to 
illustrate the growth and political control of Plumb’s ‘Venetian’ 
oligarchy, E.P. Thompson’s ‘Old Corruption’, John Cannon’s 
‘Aristocratic Century’, J.C.D. Clark’s ‘Ancien Regime’ or Linda 
Colley’s ‘élite’.7 On the other, they emphasise the caution of 
Thompson, Phillips, Dickinson and O’Gorman about the amount of 
effort required to maintain such dominance. If it was difficult to 
control those sources of power that seem the most susceptible to 
the influence of the elite, how deep were the roots of this ancien 
regime, and how natural was deference towards it?
This article looks in detail at the electoral history of one such 
borough - Clitheroe in Lancashire. This was a ‘burgage’ borough, 
where the right to vote was tied to possession of one of the 102 
enfranchised burgages in the town. Between 1693 and 1780 it 
experienced a number of contested elections and by-elections. The 
chronology of these contests and the history of burgage ownership 
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appear superficially to fit Plumb’s model of political stability 
through encroaching oligarchy. Between 1693 and 1722 there were 
nine contested elections in the borough, but between 1722 and 
1780 there was only one.8 In 1693 fifty-six burgesses had owned 
these 102 burgages. By 1780, only ten people were burgage 
owners, with 88½ burgages being owned by two Gentry families.9 
Yet, when examined in detail, the history of electoral politics in 
Clitheroe appears to support Dickinson and O’Gorman’s 
contentions that even the narrowest electorates and most regulated 
franchises required local management, knowledge and 
manipulation.
Clitheroe’s eighteenth-century politics also raises deeper 
questions about the nature of political control or ‘patronage’, by 
providing an opportunity to analyse this growth of ‘oligarchy’, and 
the political effects of this transfer of power in the town. In some 
respects, the key question is not why the process followed Plumb’s 
developmental path, but rather, why did it not occur earlier? 
Clitheroe was a medium-sized burgage borough, in which a holding 
of forty or fifty properties (and votes) would have been decisive, 
but this did not occur until after the 1727 election. This begs 
questions about the style and purposes of political management 
through the period. Why did interested prospective candidates in 
the 1690s not attempt to secure electoral support through a 
plurality of burgage ownership? What forms of local electoral 
management rendered this method redundant or even 
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inconceivable? Was the creation of dominant burgage holdings a 
result of electoral competition, or the device employed to 
extinguish it?
(I)
Clitheroe’s history exemplifies one strand of the ‘urban’ experience 
– the small, unincorporated town – and one strand of electoral 
history – the ‘burgage’ borough. Throughout the period covered by 
this paper, Clitheroe barely deserves to be called a town, by most 
accepted measures. In 1801 only 257 households inhabited the 
town, and 1,368 inhabitants in total.10 A century earlier, the total 
population was probably less than 1,000.11 Clitheroe’s population 
was tiny even by the standards of this under-urbanised region.12
While Clitheroe struggled at the bottom of the ‘urban 
hierarchy’ in economic and social terms, it had more significant 
administrative functions. It had been a parliamentary borough 
since 1558. Although it was not a borough by royal charter, its 
rights were founded on a medieval baronial charter, but this left its 
corporate structure under-developed, and manorial. Nevertheless, 
it did possess a civil court and a sitting of the peripatetic 
Lancashire Quarter Sessions. The town also functioned as the 
administrative hub of the honour of Clitheroe, an important royal 
manorial jurisdiction extending approximately ten to fifteen miles 
around the town. So, despite having little to distinguish it from 
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neighbouring villages in economic and social terms, Clitheroe 
exercised a range of administrative responsibilities that were solely 
the prerogative of the town.
As Table 1 illustrates, there were twenty-seven other burgage 
boroughs, out of the 203 English boroughs in the eighteenth 
century (or 14 percent).13 Although Phillips notes that such 
boroughs had an average of 130 voters, large boroughs inflated 
this figure. Pontefract and Richmond in Yorkshire and Cockermouth 
in Cumberland contained over 250 burgages, whereas Clitheroe, 
with its 102 burgages, was in the ‘second division’.14 Most burgage 
boroughs possessed between 50-100 burgages, while the notorious 
borough of Old Sarum in Wiltshire, had about eleven long-lost 
burgage plots and no inhabitants.15 The Table shows that only 
Appleby, Chippenham, Pontefract, Richmond, Ripon and Westbury 
possessed corporations, and most of these did not supplant 
manorial jurisdictions. Most had low total populations, with several 
such as Bere Alston, Bletchingley or Great Bedwyn, being 
described by contemporaries as bare ‘miserable’ rows of cottages 
ranged along a single street.16 These two facts suggest that, like 
Clitheroe, most of these boroughs were essentially stunted 
medieval urban foundations.
In this sense, Clitheroe was representative of this minority 
‘urban’ electorate and the trends apparent in these burgage 
boroughs. Between the late seventeenth and the late eighteenth 
centuries, a majority of burgages in these boroughs fell into the 
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hands of the gentry. In the late seventeenth century, no one family 
owned a majority or a plurality of the burgages in fourteen of the 
twenty-eight boroughs’ elections.17 By the mid-eighteenth century, 
most of these boroughs were under the controlling interest of a 
couple of Gentry families (and generally less than four or five). In 
the second half of the eighteenth century, these joint interests were 
often bought out, amalgamated by marriage or inheritance, or sold 
off to new entrants in local politics. Except in Chippenham, where 
wealthy clothiers held the gentry at bay, burgage ownership was 
consolidated into fewer and fewer hands.18
In Clitheroe voters had either to own freehold burgages, or 
lease them for not less than a year. Burgages, and their possessors, 
had to be accepted by the jury of the Court of Inquiry, impannelled 
every January.19 In 1693, there had been only about ninety 
recognised burgages, but by 1780 this number had increased to 
102 through subdivision and the ‘creative’ interpretation of 
rights.20 Voters were divided into three groups. Out-burgesses were 
non-resident owners of burgages, often drawn from gentry living in 
east Lancashire or the Yorkshire Pennines. In-burgesses were 
resident burgage owners. All burgage owners possessed only one 
vote, whatever the number of their holdings. The definition of the 
third category, of ‘Free inhabitants’, was disputed, but they were 
usually accepted to be lessees to burgage owners.21 They could 
vote for their property, provided the owner did not do so first. Two 
bailiffs governed the town, who acted as the returning officers for 
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parliamentary elections. The burgesses and free inhabitants chose 
the ‘Out-bailiff’ from among neighbouring Gentry out-burgesses. 
The ‘In-bailiff’ was chosen from the in-burgesses, and was of lower 
status. As will be shown below, the bailiffs often had an important 
influence on returns in contested elections.
(II)
Michael Mullett has traced political development in the Restoration 
era in Clitheroe, building on the exhaustive writings of the early 
20th-century local historian, William Self Weeks.22 Mullett 
emphasised the borough’s relatively seamless political movement 
towards loyalism in the 1660s, and the consequent political 
marginalisation of a vigorous, but minority, ‘Presbyterian’ 
interest.23  This was focused on the neighbouring gentleman, Sir 
Ralph Assheton of Whalley, who represented the borough in the 
Long Parliament, and during the Exclusion crisis, but who was 
otherwise thwarted after 1662.24 By contrast, Crown influence was 
reasserted through the officers and power of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, and by the granting in 1662 of the Honour of Clitheroe 
to the Moncks, Dukes of Albermarle.25
At the same time, there was a growth in the local influence of 
Roger Kenyon of Peel, clerk of the Peace for Lancashire, and 
electoral agent in the borough for the main political power in the 
county, the Stanleys, earls of Derby. Kenyon cultivated close ties 
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with the leading burgesses in Clitheroe, buying favour by working 
on their behalf, particularly over the surrender of the borough’s 
charter in 1684.26 At this time, he also restrained moves by the 
inhabiting burgesses to assemble a collective political strength that 
outweighed their formal constitutional weakness and the dictates 
of these competing noblemen.27 Their alliance with Kenyon ensured 
that they were kept largely within the Tory fold. As Mullett shows, 
although James II’s reign disrupted the process, an unwritten 
accommodation had been reached, whereby the borough favoured 
one ‘local’ candidate (of suitable political loyalty to the Crown), 
plus one other selected through uneasy compromises between the 
Albermarles and the Stanleys, brokered by Roger Kenyon.28
This was a process of political management that depended 
primarily on influence within the borough, and the power 
structures of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Court. A 
preponderance of influence in either of these two areas could 
secure electoral success, but influence in both was more likely to 
keep all parties happy and co-operative. For example, although Sir 
Ralph Assheton won the Exclusion election of February 1679, by 
cultivating local contacts and exploiting the temporary suspicions 
about royal government, he lost in November 1680 when Kenyon 
mobilised the burgesses behind another local candidate who was 
also politically acceptable to the Crown.29
Mullett’s analysis of these shifting power relations is detailed 
and convincing. However, he also suggests that the politics of this 
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post-Restoration period established ‘the main lines of behaviour... 
down to 1832’.30 I want to show that, in fact, the period after 1690 
created a new political situation within the borough, and called for 
a new strategy to manage it.
(III)
The Revolution of 1688-9 had only muted effects on Clitheroe 
politics. It coincided with the death of the 2nd Duke of Albermarle, 
and the political eclipse of a family closely associated with James 
II’s ‘personal rule’. The bailiffs of Clitheroe tried to exploit this 
political uncertainty, and the power vacuum in the Duchy of 
Lancaster.31 They evaded the earl of Derby’s attempts to foist his 
brother James Stanley on them, and reminded him that:
...your Lordship’s Recomendacon must be seconded by the 
personall appearance of some interested person in that place 
& no body more for that worke then Cousan Kenyon....32
Clearly, the in-burgesses believed they could retain more 
influence by dealing through Roger Kenyon than directly with the 
earl’s family. Clitheroe was too far outside the Stanley’s core 
estates in central and west Lancashire to feel the immediate 
pressure of ‘landlord-ism’, even if it was too circumspect to reject 
the earl outright.
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For the Convention Parliament in Jan. 1689, the borough 
chose local lawyer and staunchly Protestant Tory, Christopher 
Wilkinson, and the rather more obscure (and Whig) Anthony 
Parker, a relative of another local Gentry family, the Parkers of 
Browsholme. In the Parliament of 1690, Kenyon replaced 
Wilkinson, against opposition from Catholic landowners and their 
tenants. 33 While Parker may have represented the acceptable face 
of Whiggery, or proved politically expedient, Kenyon had attempted 
to exclude him. Before the 1689 election, Parker wrote urgently to 
his kinsman Edward Parker of Browsholme, saying that he was 
about to be imprisoned for a debt owed to a Kenyon supporter.
I doe believe the occasion of his calling for it now is because I 
have proposed my selfe to stand for this Towne & he solicits 
for Mr. Kenyon & thinks by calling his money in will disenable 
mee to prosecute my resolutions...34
Evidently, in the vacuum of 1688-9 Kenyon was showing 
ambitions to gain control of both seats in Clitheroe. As it was, he 
had to wait until Parker was overwhelmed by alcoholism in April 
1693.35
Immediately on hearing the news of his death the ‘Cheef 
persons of the Burrow’ settled upon John Weddell, the borough’s 
recorder and nephew of reliable Tory Christopher Wilkinson as 
their preferred candidate.36 For them, Weddell may have seemed 
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the best candidate to deliver the borough into the moderate Tory 
interest, without handing it over to the Stanleys. At first, Kenyon 
diplomatically expressed a preference for Philip Bertie, brother of 
the (Whig) Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Willoughby 
of Eresby. However, the early canvassing on Weddell’s behalf 
forced Kenyon to suggest that it would be best for Bertie to 
withdraw with his pride intact.37 This manoeuvring by the 
borough’s ‘cheef persons’ may have disrupted Kenyon’s efforts to 
hedge his bets at a time of change in national politics, as William III 
re-established contacts with leading Whigs, after three years of 
favouring some of James’ closest advisors.38
While the elections of 1689-90 occurred with minimal 
intervention from the Duchy, by 1693 it was firmly Williamite and 
Whig.39 The earl of Derby’s refusal to serve as Lord Lieutenant 
allowed the appointment of the ardent Whig, Charles Gerard, Lord 
Brandon.40 Despite being a supporter of Monmouth, Gerard had 
nevertheless been Deputy Lord Lieutenant under James. His father, 
the earl of Macclesfield, had been an exiled supporter of the prince 
of Orange, and these varied connections allowed him to negotiate 
the awkward change of regimes.41
In the 1693 by-election, Brandon put up his brother, Fitton 
Gerard.42 Brandon’s position in relation to the borough explains the 
nature of the subsequent contest, and much of the electoral 
management of the borough over the next thirty years. As far as 
Kenyon, the neighbouring Gentry, and Clitheroe’s rulers were 
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concerned, Brandon was an interloper. An anonymous narrative of 
the election, prepared on Weddell’s behalf, gives a sense of the 
scorn with which the burgesses met Brandon’s overtures. On 2 May 
1693, Brandon wrote to the Bailiffs of Clitheroe, reminding them 
that he had suggested they remain ‘disingaged… till somebody fit 
for your service might be proposed’.43 He now recommended his 
brother. The narrative observed caustically that ‘the Request 
wanted not a good share of confidence comeing from a stranger to 
the town & on behalf of One that is neither res[id]ant nor free 
there’.44 It asked ‘what consideration can this bear, but that as hee 
is our Lord Lieutenant wee are bound to choose who hee will [?]’.
Brandon’s agent, the county muster master, began a round of 
liberal hospitality, telling local Tory notables, Ambrose Pudsey and 
Thomas Lister that the Lord Lieutenant had the power to be ‘kind 
or cross’ with the town.45 He invoked the memory of Brandon’s 
electoral campaign at Lancaster in 1685, when a large number of 
(well-paid) militia had been quartered in that town.46 The same 
could be done to the benefit of Clitheroe’s tradesmen and retailers, 
which Weddell’s party interpreted ‘as a treating of the Town, at the 
Country’s purse’.47
These crude electoral threats were made for the same reason 
that the borough felt able to be dismissive of Brandon’s attentions. 
At the start of the campaign, he lacked a power base in the town, a 
local organiser, and a bridgehead of burgages from which to mount 
a successful fight. Brandon’s most powerful weapons were to prove 
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his control of the militia, his efforts at securing popular support, 
and his connections at Court.
He soon gained an ally in the widow of the deceased MP, Mrs. 
Ann Parker, daughter of Sir Thomas Stringer (MP in the late 1670s 
and 1681-5).48 She threw herself wholeheartedly into the campaign 
to support Fitton Gerard as her husband’s parliamentary successor, 
and the young Cheshire gentleman Roger Mainwaring as out-bailiff 
(and returning officer) of the town.49 Weddell’s supporters alleged 
that she undertook the task with rather more enthusiasm than 
discretion. Robert Page later testified to the Commons’ election 
committee that she caused the curtains of her husband’s house to 
be cut up and made into thirty coats of green and blue for the 
children of Gerard’s voters.50 This gendered largesse was matched 
by her spending on alcohol and sums of two shillings to people who 
would disrupt the open outcry voting.
Such frantic and crude canvassing was necessary because of 
the pattern of ownership of burgages in 1693. As Table 2 shows, a 
majority of these were owned individually, or in pairs (64 percent of 
the total).51 The largest blocs were thirteen held by the (formerly 
Presbyterian) Asshetons of Whalley; nine by the Catholic (and 
Jacobite) Walmesleys of Dunkenhaigh and the Sherburns of 
Stonyhurst; five by the heirs of Sir Thomas Stringer; five by the two 
local Nowell families; four by the two Lister families and four by 
the two Marsdens. After the death of Sir Ralph, the Asshetons 
became politically indifferent, splitting their votes and those of 
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their tenants between Gerard and Weddell. The Catholic 
Walmesleys and their successors kept their distance from the post-
1689 settlement.52 The Stringer properties were brought out in 
favour of Gerard. The Nowell families were split between both 
candidates. The Listers were in favour of Weddell, as were the 
Marsdens (unlike one of their tenants).
Electoral management in this period was, therefore, a matter 
of interest, influence and obligation, rather than something 
dictated by ownership and landlord power. While Mullett is 
undoubtedly correct to detect a strain of borough independence in 
the politics of the post-Restoration era, this must also be due (in 
part) to the complicated process of actually delivering a majority. 
Burgesses had to be persuaded, overawed, or bribed, because they 
could not generally be told how to vote.
This is evident if we examine the Inquiry Jury for 1693.53 This 
consisted of twenty-two men. Fourteen were burgage owners in 
their own right, and eight were tenants (including two who were 
related to the owner). All the burgage owners were ‘independent’, 
owning only one or two burgages each. The only significant tenant 
relationships existed for the two burgages possessed by Sir Ralph 
Assheton’s heirs, and one by Thomas Stringer (future MP).54
The independence of the jury (or the care with which it was 
selected) is also evident in its voting patterns. Eleven jurors voted 
for the ‘Tory’ candidates for bailiffs, ten for the ‘Whig’ candidates, 
and two appear not to have voted.55 The parliamentary candidates 
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could have little direct hold over such a group, who were not 
enmeshed in formal clientage relationships, or inherently biased to 
either side. Instead, the parties appear to have managed the jury 
by two strategies. Firstly, they persuaded them not to report new 
burgesses. One of the 1694 jury admitted to Parliament that they 
had avoided meeting in order to evade determination of votes 
inserted by writ of mandamus.56 Secondly, the bailiffs ignored their 
presentments, a pattern that was repeated in 1695 and 1722.57 
However, this was management of the electoral process by evasion 
of procedure, rather than by exerting control over it.
While we only really have a record of the electoral activities 
of the local Gentry, we can also sense the calculus employed by the 
voters of Clitheroe. Clearly, they favoured candidates who were 
known, and had local connections that bound them to the interest 
of the borough. This was helped by prior service as an out-bailiff or 
recorder – proof that the candidate could be of real use to the town. 
They also respected a display of powerful patronage relationships. 
Roger Kenyon provided a direct line to the earl of Derby.58 The duke 
of Albermarle had provided favoured access to James II. Fitton 
Gerard had impeccable contacts with the new Whig ascendancy. As 
these links waxed and waned, so did local support for their 
possessors. The Chancellor of the Duchy’s secretary wrote to 
Kenyon a month before the 1693 election that although, ‘your 
endeavours have made two Parliament men att Clitherow; and it 
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seemed to me probable you might have sett faire for a third, … it 
may be tempora mutantur’.59
The elections for bailiffs and for Parliament showed that 
times had definitely changed. The election for out-bailiff in October 
was tied between Wilkinson and Roger Mainwaring, whose critics 
alleged he was unknown in the borough, and not yet twenty-one.60 
The distribution of votes indicates a possible difference in the 
electoral strategies of the two parties. The ‘Tory’ candidates for 
bailiffs, Wilkinson, and John Lister of Westby (another member of 
the local Lister clan), secured the votes of thirteen of the out-
burgesses, thirteen of the in-burgesses, and sixteen of the ‘free 
inhabitants’, with only two split votes for Lister and Mainwaring. 
This distribution indicates that Kenyon’s links were with the 
burgage owners, and the established power structure of the 
borough. The ‘Whig’ candidates for bailiffs, Mainwaring and 
Clitheroe resident Thomas Dugdale, obtained the votes of only six 
out-burgesses, ten in-burgesses, but twenty-one ‘free inhabitants’, 
plus three more who may not have been properly qualified. 
Gerard’s party may either have sought, or simply been more 
successful in obtaining, support from those outside the town’s 
ruling group, so as to overcome their weakness among the burgage 
owners. They also used the militia and Lord Lieutenancy as an 
alternative source of patronage for those outside the Kenyon-circle. 
Weddell’s supporters noted, graphically, that one of Mainwaring’s 
chief local supporters, who had led an abortive riot after the poll, 
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had been ‘made a Militia Officer – so the whore was marryed to 
make her an honest woman – Militia Officers may do anything’.61
In the event, both sides claimed victory, and Wilkinson’s 
supporters objected to the votes of fifteen of Mainwaring’s voters, 
including five militia officers inserted as freemen only by a writ of 
mandamus.62 Not to be outdone, Gerard’s party alleged in their 
printed ‘Case’ that an armed ‘show down’ had occurred when 
Wilkinson, Christopher Lister and Ambrose Pudsey had burst into:
a Publick House, where some of Mr. Gerard’s Friends were 
peaceably Drinking together... Thomas Lister esq. and 
Ambrose Pudsey esq. set pistols to the Breasts of severall of 
them, and Mr. John Lister, Bayliff, threw one of them to the 
Ground, and Trampled upon him.63
On the 25th November, Wilkinson’s supporters informed 
Kenyon that Gerard and Mainwaring had sneaked into the town’s 
Moothall and proclaimed the date of the election for the following 
Thursday (30 November).64 Predictably, the election descended into 
farce. In a symbol of his support among the borough elite, 
Wilkinson conducted the poll for Weddell in the Moothall. Equally 
symbolically, Mainwaring adjourned the poll for Gerard to the 
borough shambles.65 The sheriff would only accept Mainwaring’s 
poll, and so returned Gerard as MP, rather than Weddell. Both had 
polled forty-five votes, but two of Weddell’s votes were 
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disqualified.66 The matter was referred to the Commons’ Committee 
for Elections, who reported in favour of Gerard. However, the 
House issued a new writ, primarily because the Parties would not 
agree on the validity of either candidate’s votes.67
Meanwhile, Wilkinson died in January 1694, and the 
parliamentary election in February was preceded by another 
chaotic contest for out-bailiff.68 At the same time, Kenyon’s 
correspondent Thomas Marsden hoped that the earl of Derby would 
‘now come out of retirement, and show himself zealous both for 
Church and State, against dissenters and republicans’.69 In the 
Parliamentary contest, Christopher Lister (a relative of the Lister 
family of Arnoldsbiggin) replaced Weddell.70 Despite these 
manoeuvres, Gerard polled forty-six votes, and Lister forty-three, 
although Lister’s supporters made last-ditch objections to forty of 
Gerard’s voters.71 They alleged that his supporters included un-
enfranchised militia officers, bribe-takers, a ‘school boy... kept upon 
Charity’, and the pairing of Henry Mercer Sr. & Jr. The Father (an 
independent burgage owner) was described as ‘a rouge that hath 
been whipt at the Rouge’s post for petty larceny’. The son, who 
voted as a lessee, was dismissed as ‘an Idiot’. Weddell’s party 
asserted that he was so drunk at the poll that two women 
attendants only cast his vote by raising his arm at the appropriate 
moment. The matter dragged on in the Commons until 18 April, but 
eventually Gerard was returned as MP.72
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These desperate tactics reflect the weakness of Kenyon and 
his local Tory interest outside the locality. The earl of Derby was 
said to believe that the shenanigans in Clitheroe ‘ought to be 
represented in Parliament’, but was firmly excluded under the 
Williamite regime.73 At the same time, in the spring of 1694 the 
newly invigorated Whig MPs in the Commons were entirely 
unsympathetic to Tory candidates, however maltreated, and the 
machinery of the Duchy, and the Shrievalty in Lancashire was 
consistently behind the Lord Lieutenant and his brother.74
The 1693 election represented a breakdown of the post-
Restoration coalition in Clitheroe, between the town’s leading 
burgesses, Kenyon, the local Tory gentry, and their connections to 
the Crown, either through the Albermarles, or the Stanleys. 
Gerard’s campaign built a new platform among the borough 
freemen by extensive petty bribery, and displays of power against 
the existing order. Such tactics were necessary because of the 
dispersed ownership of burgages. Neither side exercised any 
automatic electoral majority by virtue of rights of ownership.
(IV)
There were further disputed elections in 1695, 1698 and 1702. This 
electoral rivalry led gradually to the construction of significant 
burgage holdings, primarily through dynastic alliances, rather than 
new purchases. By 1700 the holdings of Thomas Stringer (son of 
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the borough’s MP of the 1670s and 80s) and his cousin, 
Christopher Parker (son of Anthony Parker) overshadowed the 
Assheton family’s twelve burgages.75 The Stringers and Parkers had 
increased their burgage holding from five in 1693 to nineteen in 
1700. All were bought piecemeal, unsurprising in a borough where 
no large holdings of burgages existed. This accumulation resulted 
from Thomas Stringer’s abortive attempt to gain Kenyon’s seat for 
the Whigs in 1695, when Tory Ambrose Pudsay defeated him, once 
again with much evident chicanery.76 Stringer acquired further 
burgages in the run-up to the 1698 election, and was returned 
despite further protests, this time from Pudsay.77
This bloc of burgages did not allow electoral domination 
within the borough, but it provided a platform of votes onto which 
others could be joined. It also indicated the creation of a serious, 
permanent electoral ‘interest’ in the town, binding one of the two 
seats to the family, and allowing Stringer’s nephew Christopher 
Parker to succeed him as MP in 1706.78 Parker was then given first 
refusal on his uncle’s eight burgages (but may only have bought 
five).
Interlopers such as Gerard would now find it more difficult to 
conduct a campaign that reached out to the ‘free inhabitants’ over 
the heads of the burgesses. Significantly, the Gerards and 
Mainwaring took no long-term interest in the borough. They lacked 
local roots or personal connections (despite Mainwaring’s marrying 
into a burgage owning family), and possibly also the resources to 
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begin building an electoral ‘estate’ in the town.79 As political 
opportunists it was easier for them to seek less contentious (and 
more prestigious) opportunities elsewhere, at Lancaster 1697-8, 
and the county seat between 1698-1700.80
The second new electoral interest was created by the 
candidacy of Edward Harvey in 1702, when he challenged Ambrose 
Pudsay for the Tory interest.81 Harvey was a cousin of the Duke of 
Montagu, who had gained control of the Honour of Clitheroe 
through marriage to Albermarle’s widow in 1692. He had failed to 
revive the Honour’s previous influence in borough politics in 1693 
and 1698, and he was a resounding third and last in the 1702 poll.82
However, he mounted a more serious campaign to replace 
Pudsay in 1705, after which he alternated with his brother Daniel 
as MP until 1713.83 Although the Harveys built upon initial electoral 
support by purchasing burgages, even in 1710 they possessed only 
three outright. Instead, they secured most of their advantage by 
allying with Thomas Lister of nearby Arnoldsbiggin. The recent 
History of Parliament volume for this period credits the Listers with 
a ‘shadowy’ power over Clitheroe.84 The difference between 
Harvey’s poor showing without their support in 1702 (half the votes 
of either Stringer or Pudsay), and his election unopposed in 1705 
was due to his cultivation of local contacts, notably the Listers.85 
They claimed ‘a very great interest’ in the borough of Clitheroe, 
and certainly could demonstrate a long connection with it, with 
members of the clan sitting for Clitheroe in the early seventeenth 
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century.86 More recently, Thomas Lister may have acted as agent 
for his kinsman Christopher Lister in the 1690s. This mixture of 
immediate and immemorial connections was a source of power in 
an area that cherished such links, and was hostile to outsiders who 
ignored them. However, the family did not exert this power by 
virtue extensive burgage ownership. At this time the Listers of 
Arnoldsbiggin held only two burgages, which they had owned since 
the sixteenth century. A cadet branch among the in-burgesses of 
Clitheroe owned two other burgages.87 By 1720 the family had 
acquired only two more.88
Thomas Lister’s local power was recognised in 1713, when he 
was elected MP after the death of Christopher Parker, but 
(presumably) using the electoral support of his ally Edward 
Harvey.89 However, the seeds of the family’s eighteenth-century 
dominance in the borough were sown in 1716, when Thomas Lister, 
and Nathaniel Curzon (a Derbyshire landowner, and MP for Derby 
1713-15) married the daughters and co-heirs of Sir Ralph Assheton 
of Whalley.90 This brought them access to Sir Ralph’s nine 
burgages, and his lease of four more under the Glebe of Whalley 
Rectory. More importantly, it allied the Listers’ local connections to 
the Curzon’s money. This proved an irresistible electoral 
combination for most of the century, but also the cause of the 
families’ ultimate falling-out in 1780.
With the death of Christopher Parker in 1713, the electoral 
interest built up by the Stringers and Parkers since 1675 was 
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transferred to Parker’s brother-in-law, Thomas Stanley of Cross 
Hall, a kinsman of the earl of Derby.91 The earl’s youngest brother, 
Charles Zedenno Stanley, was elected MP in 1713, and after his 
death in 1715, Thomas Parker, cousin of Christopher, was defeated 
by Edward Harvey in another closely fought election.92 Once again, 
Lister and Harvey engaged in careful electoral management. An 
annotated poll book from this election reveals that Lister’s agent 
had identified nine of Harvey’s voters who might ‘be prevailed to 
vote for Mr. P’, and eight of Parker’s supporters who might be 
persuaded to vote the other way.93 True to the litigious spirit of 
Burgage franchises, he also listed eleven ‘bad votes’ whose 
legitimacy could be challenged should they be tendered.94
Despite this setback, by 1720 the Stanley owned eighteen 
burgages, thirteen of which were inherited from Stringer and 
Parker. It was the largest electoral bloc in the borough, but once 
again ownership was insufficient to secure even one of the town’s 
two seats. Stanley also attempted to buttress his influence in the 
borough by drawing on the earl of Derby’s power and interests. 
Despite possessing this external and internal leverage, Stanley had 
alienated at least twenty burgesses, who complained to their MPs, 
Thomas Lister and Edward Harvey in December 1717.
Gentlemen, when our rights are invaded we apply ourselves 
to you our Representatives, knowing it your Interests, as well 
as inclinations to stand by us in all just, and legal defences... 
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all occasion’d by Mr. Thomas Stanley, who being made a 
Justice of Peace and Captain of the Militia; and being thereby 
rais’d above the level of other ordinary men, doth take upon 
him to do whatever he inclines to.95
They accused Stanley of trying to secure the election of the 
earl of Derby’s steward as out-bailiff of the town by raising ‘four or 
five and Twenty of the Mobish freemen’. He had threatened that 
‘the Lord Derby wou’d stand by him... although we cannot believe 
that either the Lord Derby or his steward will countenance such 
tumultuous actings’. Another hand added the instruction ‘you are 
desir’d, if you think fit, to let the Lord Derby know what use this 
Gent. makes of his lordships favour’.96 This exposure of Stanley’s 
high-handedness shows that the borough felt sufficiently insulated 
from the earl’s power base to mobilise its two MPs against the 
Stanley interest.
(V)
In the twenty-nine years after 1693, a combination of dynastic links 
and purchasing led to the formation of modest but visible electoral 
blocs – particularly for the successive Stringer/Parker/Stanley 
interest. Less obvious, but undoubtedly real, was the influence 
exerted over the borough by the Lister/Harvey grouping. This was 
closer to the power of Roger Kenyon than that of the Stringers, and 
was built upon the same political alignments. In particular, there 
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was a persistent rumour that this group harboured Jacobite 
sympathies. Back in 1693 the earl of Scarborough had written to 
the Marquis of Carmarthen alleging that ‘Weddell and his party are 
Jacobites’.97 Edward Harvey corresponded with the Court of St. 
Germain, and attempted suicide after his arrest in 1715.98 In 1749 
Lord Egmont’s electoral survey recorded that Lister’s son was ‘a 
strong and sour Jacobite’.99 As late as the election of 1780, the 
diarist Elizabeth Shackleton recorded that one of her neighbours 
thought the Listers were ‘all Jacobites’.100 If so, the 1715 election 
may represent something of a coup by ‘Jacobite’ sympathisers, 
ending nearly two decades of (at least nominal) joint Whig-Tory 
returns. Thereafter the Whig interest in the borough was 
eliminated.
This extinction would certainly not have been seemed likely 
in Clitheroe on the eve of the election in March 1722. Between 
1720 and 1722 two prospective Whig candidates made the most 
rapid accumulation of burgages seen there to that date. One, John 
Monckton (later Viscount Galway) was a Yorkshire landowner.101 
The other was James Haldane, a London lawyer active as a dealer 
in sequestered Jacobite estates, such as that of the Andertons of 
Lostock.102 These two bought up fifteen out of Stanley and Harvey’s 
eighteen burgages. By 1722 Monckton had acquired twenty-one, 
while Haldane possessed a further seven. This gave them direct 
control over twenty-eight burgages, while Lister and his brother-in-
law Nathaniel Curzon, held fifteen, and controlled two others by 
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mortgage and reversion agreements. However, Lister and Curzon 
could now also call on the Asshetons’ six burgages, giving near 
parity to Monckton and Haldane.103
Table 2 shows considerable consolidation compared to 1693. 
Then, almost two-thirds of the burgages had been owned singly or 
in pairs, with only the Asshetons holding more than ten. There had 
been fifty-six owners of the 102 burgages. By 1722 there were only 
thirty-five burgage owners, and now less than one-third of the 
burgages were owned individually or in pairs. Between them, 
Lister, Curzon, Haldane & Monckton now owned forty-five 
burgages, with control of the Assheton properties ensuring that the 
four men controlled fifty-one of the borough’s 102 burgages. 
Almost as many burgages were now held in holdings of more than 
ten, as were owned singly.
These property links imply a different kind of electoral 
contest to the largely uncontrolled affair in 1693. Yet, the ensuing 
election was no more predictable. Despite their expensive 
preparations, Haldane and Monckton lost comprehensively. The 
two main blocs Monckton-Haldane, and Lister-Curzon, maintained 
impressive voter discipline, with only split vote among the Lister & 
Curzon burgages, and one Curzon voter being attracted to the 
opposition.104 Most of the local Gentry holdings voted for Lister & 
Curzon, including the burgages of the Asshetons’ burgages (bar 
one), Richard Shuttleworth of Gawthorpe’s seven burgages, 
Alexander Nowell of Read’s, the heirs of Roger Kenyon, the Parkers 
26
of Browsholme, and assorted Clitheroe burgage holders. Haldane 
and Monckton picked up some support among the independent 
burgesses, but generally in the form of hedged votes, rather than 
outright endorsements. Possibly deliberately, the burgages of 
Assheton of Cuerdale, and of the Catholic Lady Petre and Duchess 
of Norfolk voted in equal numbers for the two pairs of 
candidates.105
Clearly, Lister & Curzon were able, as Kenyon had been, to 
mobilise the support of the neighbouring Gentry burgage owners 
and their tenants. This may have forced Haldane & Monckton to 
buy burgages to secure votes, rather than rely on local loyalties 
and social networks. Their chief electoral error seems to have been 
either to fall foul of the system for enfranchising voters. They had 
eleven burgesses and free inhabitants disqualified by the bailiffs, 
apparently because of inadequate conveyances to their tenant 
‘freemen’ electors.106 In the subsequent Commons protest, the 
borough inquiry jury alleged that when they had objected at the 
poll to these exclusions:
and thereupon offering to the said Bayliffs a list of Persons to 
be inserted in a Call Book... one of the Bayliffs did upon the 
bench in a violent and Indecent manner tear the same and 
commanded the Clerk to proceed to Poll.107
27
The Jury also described one Bailiff as ‘a menial servant to Mr. 
Lister’.108 Of the fifty-five signatories to this petition, forty-two can 
be identified as voters, of whom thirty-nine voted either for 
Haldane & Monckton, or split their votes between the two camps.
The 1722 election demonstrated that local connections and a 
degree of legal guile could still outweigh a slight superiority in the 
numbers of burgages owned. However, although electoral 
behaviour was unpredictable, property rights were becoming more 
significant in determining voting patterns. Clitheroe was moving 
towards becoming a ‘pocket borough’. The dispute was now about 
into whose pocket it would fall. It was much easier to contemplate 
the creation of such a ‘pocket’ borough when only five families 
owned a majority of the burgages, compared to the earlier 
dispersed pattern of ownership. The 1722 election also hinted that 
where only one family owned an outright majority of burgages, 
there could no longer be any question of a Haldane or a Monckton 
trying to lever open the electoral process.
(VI)
The participants to the 1722 election appear to have drawn this 
conclusion themselves. Monckton sought election again for 
Clitheroe in 1727, but did a deal with Nathaniel Curzon by which 
he agreed to sell his burgages to Lister and Curzon jointly in return 
for Curzon’s seat in the forthcoming Parliament. He invested the 
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purchase money in burgages in his home borough of Pontefract.109 
At the same time Haldane was encumbered by cases about the 
forfeited Jacobite estates, and may also have wanted to sell.110
For the cost of £4,500 Lister & Curzon received thirteen 
burgages from Monckton, eight from Haldane, and a further eleven 
or twelve formerly the estate of Thomas Stringer, plus two 
others.111 Their Glebe lease of four burgages augmented this joint 
estate giving thirty-eight or thirty-nine votes. When these were 
added to Lister’s thirteen burgages and Curzon’s two, the families 
now exercised direct control over fifty-three or fifty-four of the 
borough’s 102 burgages. Between 1731 and 1761 the families only 
bought another three burgages. As Assheton Curzon remarked in 
1780, ‘they two had a complete majority in the Borough, and ... 
nobody else, if they agreed could molest them’.112
Obviously, this control of the burgages changed Clitheroe’s 
political dynamics by preventing the borough elite, the in-
burgesses, from having a choice of electoral networks. Since 1661, 
Clitheroe had always been too small, and lacking in formal 
constitutional powers, to assert its independence over the 
neighbouring gentry and aristocratic patrons. However, through 
procedural manipulation, and the exploitation of personal loyalties, 
the burgesses and freemen had often played off such interlopers 
against each other, or fought off a powerful outsider by mobilising 
local patronage networks.
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The predominance of the Listers & Curzons eliminated these 
alternative choices. In effect, the two families served the same 
function as the competing networks had done in the past. The 
Listers, living only five miles distant at Gisburn Park, maintained 
local networks and personal connections.113 The Curzons, living in 
Derbyshire, and moving more confidently among the ranks of the 
‘greater gentry’, provided patronage links to the centre, even if the 
family’s prime political concern was to secure a peerage, rather 
than to promote the borough’s interests.
As Assheton Curzon had noted, though, this all depended on 
the continuing political and social co-operation between the two 
families. Outwardly, the familial alliance survived without problems 
for three generations. However, there were ongoing tensions. As 
early as the 1720s the families considered the division of their joint 
estate in Glebe properties and burgages inherited by Sir Ralph 
Assheton’s daughters.114 In 1780, one of Thomas Lister’s advisors 
stated that the Curzons alleged that they had been sole purchasers 
of the Monckton & Haldane burgages, so that the Listers sat as 
MPs in Clitheroe entirely due to their influence.115 He remembered 
that before the 1761 election Thomas Lister Sr. had preferred his 
brother Nathaniel to Assheton Curzon, relenting eventually, but 
telling Curzon:
Well cousin I have brought you in at the Request of my 
Brother, but I tell you in your face that I can bring in two 
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members for Clitheroe whenever I please in opposition to 
you.
At the 1783 election another witness repeated the story, to 
defend the Listers from the charge that they were a ‘Mushroom 
family’ – recently sprung up.116 
Thomas Lister died in 1761 leaving a nine-year old heir. In 
1764, Nathaniel Lister wrote a letter that confirms stories of the 
family’s resentment towards the Curzons. He stated:
The Curzon family had no possessions or Interest in Clitheroe 
till my father took them by the Hand. The want of money at 
that Time made it necessary so to do... Far be it from me to 
propose any Thing that seems to bear hard upon the Curzon 
family, whom I love & Honor but… the Listers must be 
allow’d to have had the precedent Right, the Curzons only a 
secondary arising from the first... if I was the acting Trustee 
for my Nephew, no man living should nestle upon his 
advantage & ground & get thereby better footing in that 
respectable Corporation...117
The implication was that the Listers were dependent on 
Curzon money for their local electoral dominance in the borough, 
and had considerable difficulty reconciling this power with their 
financial inferiority to the Curzons, whose wealth derived from 
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Derbyshire lead mines.118 Thomas Lister Jr. was brought up with 
these attitudes, but also with Assheton Curzon as one of his 
guardians. His resentments were recorded in the history of the 102 
burgages put together by his agents in 1782:
Owing to some Ill Treatment Mr. Lister received from Mr. 
Curzon soon after he came of age [in 1773]; having reasons 
also for suspicion and dissatisfaction from the conduct of 
Sclater Mr. Curzon’s Agent – and withal born and possessed 
with the idea that Mr. Curzon had enjoyed a seat for this 
Borough entirely thro’ the Favor of his Family Mr. Lister 
determined not even to give Mr. Curzon a plausible Pretext 
for alledging... there was any Honorary Tie or Engagement 
for continuing to support him or his interests in Clitheroe.119
Lister suspected that Sclater had been purchasing burgages 
secretly on Curzon’s behalf and conveying Lister properties as joint 
Lister & Curzon ones.120 Significantly, while the Listers used the 
same language of electoral ‘interest’ as correspondents had ninety 
years before, interest now equalled ‘property’. In the litany of 
complaints made against the Curzons, it was objected that:
Mr. Curzon has been remarkably negligent in civility to the 
Gentlemen of the County... being told of it by a friend, he 
answer’d very short ‘what occasion have I to court them, my 
Interest is Property [?]’.121
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As far as the Curzons were concerned, this shared majority of 
burgages guaranteed that Listers & Curzons would sit for the town 
in perpetuity, and without challenge.
(VII)
It was presumably with this thought in mind that Assheton Curzon 
wrote to Thomas Lister on 28 June 1780. Curzon had sat for 
Clitheroe since 1761, and now wanted to step down in favour of his 
twenty-three-year old son, Penn Assheton Curzon. He told Lister:
I think he deserves to have his abilities brought forward and I 
can do it no way so well, as by letting him have an 
opportunity of joining in the debates of the House of 
Commons...122
He assumed the election would be a formality, but thought it 
a necessary courtesy to inform Lister of his intentions, and to 
organise the matter by conveying the joint-burgages to new voters. 
Dependent burgesses and freemen would not need to be persuaded 
or coerced. As one, John Barcroft, admitted to Penn Assheton 
Curzon, ‘I consider myself a trustee for the real owner or owners, 
and as to my vote... it must follow the property’, despite the fact 
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that Barcroft was Steward of the Honour of Clitheroe, a lawyer and 
gentleman of independent landed income.123
Unfortunately for Curzon, these joint burgages were central 
to the electoral coup that Lister had been planning for nearly a 
year. As early as September 1779, Lister’s agent noted that the 
absence of Curzon’s steward in London would provide ‘a better 
opportunity to Purchase & c. without giving alarm’.124 The following 
May, he mentioned that a burgage could be purchased ‘without 
creating the least suspicion of you having any concern in the 
matter’.125 On 29 May, the agent reported that he had made one 
purchase ‘pretending to be upon treaty with Mr. Thompson (near 
Halifax)’.126 In early July Assheton & Penn Assheton Curzon visited 
Lister at his London lodgings, to discuss conveyances to new voters 
and recorded that Lister had said, emphatically, ‘I can have no 
objection to my friend Penn’.127 It soon became clear that he had no 
intention of supporting him, either.
Within days, Lister was canvassing for the second seat in 
Clitheroe on behalf of his brother-in-law, local gentleman John 
Parker of Browsholme.128 After receiving legal advice enjoining ‘the 
utmost candor and openness to Mr. Lister’,129 Assheton Curzon 
wrote to Lister on 22 July, expressing his hurt:
An attack of the severe nature you now level against me 
seldom comes from a Friend & Relation without something of 
a peculiar kind has happened to give rise to & Justify it… I 
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own I thought I had a better right to a second interest in the 
borough than any other Person & the whole course of my 
conduct thro’ your childhood & since you came of age proves 
that I never thought of a first... I must further say that in 
thought or deed I never did you or any of your interest an 
injury in all my life.130
Through the election in October and the subsequent 
parliamentary appeal, the families stuck to two different strategies. 
Lister refused to make one-year ‘sham conveyances’ to voters on 
any of the shared burgages, insisting on a narrow construction of 
the franchise that limited voting rights to burgage owners or their 
tenants. This gave him a personal property advantage over 
Curzon.131 Meanwhile, Curzon adhered consistently to the Rev. 
Richard Assheton’s advice that ‘all Freeholders who have Estates 
for life or in fee in the Borough’ could vote, which would extend the 
franchise to all freehold lands, instead of just recognised burgages, 
so overcoming Curzon’s numerical disadvantage.132 
Curzon’s advisors considered the various voting 
permutations, believing they could knock Parker into third place if 
electoral custom could be revised in their favour.133 However, this 
strategy could only be tested by Parliament after the election. In 
the mean time, both families tried to purchase as many of the 
remaining burgages as possible, but fell victim to the laws of 
supply and demand. In 1761 there were twenty-five remaining 
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independent burgage owners, with forty-five burgages. After the 
purchases of Lister & Curzon’s steward, Robert Sclater, during 
Lister’s minority there remained only twenty burgage owners and 
thirty-three burgages on the eve of the 1780 election.134
Prices rocketed in the frenetic atmosphere preceding the 
election. One of Lister’s attorneys testified later that between 1726 
and 1775 the two families had spent a total of £9,013 on forty-
seven burgage properties in the borough.135 By contrast, between 
July and October 1780, Lister had spent £24,490 buying a further 
fifteen burgages – including John Stanley’s eighty-one acres of 
freehold land.136 Lister’s agent, Richard Eddleston, was forced to 
admit taking advantage of this seller’s market, having sold two 
burgages to Lister for £300 each and refused £500 for another 
from Curzon’s agent, in July and August 1780.137 In a last ditch 
effort in September 1780 Lister dispatched a servant non-stop to 
Lulworth Castle in Dorset, to negotiate the sale of 2½ burgages 
from Thomas Weld (heir to the Sherburns of Stonyhurst). The price 
agreed was £2,000 or £800 per burgage – for properties said to be 
worth just £10 per annum.138 Meanwhile, in purchasing a further 
five burgages, as well as pursuing his electoral strategy of buying 
freehold estates, Curzon spent £11,881 between July and 
December 1780.139
Table 2 shows the extent to which Clitheroe had become a 
pocket borough on the eve of the 1780 election. Lister, Curzon, and 
Lister & Curzon jointly now owned 80 percent of the burgages in 
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the town. Individually, Lister now owned 26½ burgages, plus one 
other where he owned the freehold, but Curzon leased the voting 
rights. Curzon owned seven burgages. Of the joint estate, twenty of 
the fifty-four burgages were not out of lease and could vote, but 
Lister’s party ensured that the Inquiry Jury rejected seventeen of 
these votes (all for Curzon).140 During the poll, on the 14 & 15 
September 1780, a further seventeen people were disqualified after 
voting for non-burgage freehold lands or leases in the borough.141 
All voted for Curzon, 9 voted for Lister as well, but none voted for 
Parker. At the end of polling, Lister received thirty-three votes, 
Parker thirty-two, and Curzon only seventeen votes. Without vetoes 
or disqualification it was estimated that Lister would have polled 
eighty-two, Curzon sixty-six, and Parker only thirty-two.
The result was achieved only after many machinations. As the 
‘inside’ candidate, Lister replicated Kenyon’s tactics of ninety 
years’ previously, by ensuring the election of Richard Eddleston as 
In-Bailiff, in order to control the poll.142 A post-election broadside 
by the Curzons reported that during the poll Eddleston was 
‘publickly offering Wagers of three or more to one upon the Return 
in Favour of the successful Candidates’.143 By contrast, Curzon 
followed the pattern set by ‘outside’ candidates without good local 
connections, by trying to widen the franchise, and by courting what 
he termed ‘popularity’, primarily through liquid refreshment. His 
agent disbursed at least £519 on alcohol, between 11 July and 13 
Sept.144 In the absence of deep local support among the burgesses, 
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the creation of an electoral ‘mob’ could be useful in disrupting the 
poll, or intimidating voters.
Both sides applied considerable pressure to the fifteen 
remaining ‘independent’ burgage owners, ranging from polite 
letters soliciting support, to more dubious means. The former 
yielded a response from Henry Hughes Lloyd in North Wales, who 
pledged his support to Penn Assheton Curzon, because he had 
known his father ‘at Westminster School’.145 The more dubious 
practices were exemplified by James Riddihough’s case. He 
possessed a vote under a three-life lease for a burgage called 
Warrens, held by his family since the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Riddihough was elderly and ‘incapable’, and his nephew 
alleged that Curzon’s agents had offered £50 to his nurse to cast 
one vote for Curzon, and none for Parker.146
The subsequent parliamentary enquiries caused both parties 
to spend several thousand pounds on legal advice, and to plunder 
the borough archives in support of their electoral strategies.147 The 
final decision favoured Lister, with the franchise being restricted to 
burgages whose provenance was established by the Inquiry jury, 
and the longstanding payment of borough rents.148
Lister excluded the Curzons again in the 1782 by-election, 
when Parker made way for the Attorney General John Lee, by 
repeating his veto of the joint conveyances.149 The families agreed 
to a formal division of their estate (and borough representation) 
only after a protracted series of legal wrangles.150 The contests left 
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Lister £48,000 in debt, although in May 1781 his Uncle Nathaniel 
reported from Bath that the Curzons were saying it was £60,000!151 
The two families observed a brittle and distrustful truce, extending 
through their ennoblement in the 1790s, until Lister sold his 
burgages to Lord Brownlow in 1802.152
The 1780 election was a brief revival of the farcical conflicts 
in the town in the period before 1722, but it also demonstrated the 
true reality of the ‘pocket’ borough. The master of the town’s 
Grammar School, Thomas Wilson provided the title for this article, 
by describing the 1780 election as ‘a game of cards... where the 
dispute was whether a man could have the preference of the game 
by honours or odd tricks’.153 The Curzons were the party of 
‘honours’, Lister the man of ‘odd tricks’, but the two of them were 
now the only players in the game.
The Curzons understood their injured honour in more specific 
terms. On the division of the joint estate in Chancery, Lister was 
informed that the Curzons presented each of their two 
commissioners with a cup, engraved ‘To the Assertors of Justice 
and the Vindicators of Injured Property’.154 This injured property 
encompassed both ownership and electoral control of the fifty-three 
joint burgages, and the uncontested, perpetual right of access to 
the second seat in Parliament for the borough.
This fact meant that whatever their similarities on the 
ground, and in the alehouses, the elections of 1693 and 1780 were 
disputed for fundamentally different reasons. The 1693 contest was 
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a struggle to secure electoral control where minimal landlord 
power existed. The 1780 election was disputed because the 
landlords fell out, and deployed their property rights against each 
other. Significantly, in this instance, the matter was resolved finally 
not by the Commons’ Committee for Elections, but the Court of 
Chancery. Politics in Clitheroe had effectively been ‘privatised’.
(VIII)
If the end result of this process is unsurprising, the big question is 
why the consolidating tendencies of a franchise based on property 
rights did not produce this result by 1693 or 1722? Put simply, it 
appears not to have occurred to any of the earlier candidates to 
solve the problems of political management in this way. Despite 
repeated contests the conventional management strategy of 
‘influence’ through local connections and wider patronage links 
continued to be effective. Roger Kenyon and the Listers were most 
adept at depicting themselves as representatives of, and conduits 
for, the opinions of the chief burgage owners. They also aimed to 
secure control of the electoral process, by nominating the bailiffs, 
and dominating the Inquiry Jury. Presumably, too, their Tory (or 
even Jacobite) sympathies chimed with the political opinions of 
many within the borough elite.
Such connections continued to leave a large body of opinion 
un-represented. This included the majority of the town’s ‘free 
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inhabitants’ – leasehold burgage tenants, possessed of the right to 
vote, but otherwise excluded from borough government. They were 
open to manipulation by incorporation within a wider ‘crowd’ of 
residents opposed to the existing political dispensation and new or 
outside candidates sought repeatedly to co-opt them. Gerard tried 
this tactic in 1693, Stanley in 1718, Monckton and Haldane in 
1722, as did Curzon in 1780. Crucially, only Gerard succeeded, 
through control over the electoral process in a manner that was 
never repeated.
Lacking local leverage, these outside candidates set off the 
gradual accumulation of burgages in the borough in the early 
eighteenth century. Until 1716, outsiders, such as the Stringers, 
Parkers, Stanley and Harvey were the most likely to buy burgages, 
in lieu of other influence. Although some established families, such 
as the Asshetons, the Walmesleys, the Nowells and the Sherburns 
each possessed several burgages, they made no concerted 
additions. The Listers exemplified the inverse relationship between 
local influence and numbers of burgages owned, since their ‘very 
great influence’ rested on possession of only two properties, as did 
that of Roger Kenyon.
Gradually, outsiders subverted this politics of local ‘interest’. 
The sudden political elevation of the Gerards to the Lord 
Lieutenancy in 1689 caused the first breach, but ironically this 
external power-base freed Fitton Gerard from the need to 
accumulate burgages, and ensured that Clitheroe was of passing 
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interest to him compared to the larger county struggle. Subsequent 
interlopers lacked the Gerards’ connections to the centre, and 
relied either on the support of the borough elite (and the Listers), 
or the purchase of burgages in the absence of such support. At the 
same time accumulation also resulted from dynastic alliances, 
between the Stringers, the Parkers and the Stanleys, and between 
the Asshetons, the Listers and the Curzons. Marriages consolidated 
local networks, and also provided the best entry route for outsiders 
(such as the Curzons).
Monckton’s sale to Lister and Curzon is fraught with 
historical contradictions. He sold precisely because he realised how 
difficult it was to deploy property rights to beat local interests. Yet, 
he used the money to buy just such an interest in his ‘home’ 
borough of Pontefract, which allowed him to use the same tactics 
against others that had been used so successfully against him. In 
Clitheroe this sale merged the Listers’ ‘great interest’ to the 
Curzon’s substantial ‘property’ within a single electoral interest. 
Clitheroe politics became a matter of burgage property, which 
followed the centripetal tendencies observed by Habakkuk for 
landed estates in general.155 Family settlements and trusts pooled, 
maintained, and added to it. If the properties in question had been 
smallholdings or family farms, the result would have been the 
same. In fact, in the borough as a whole it was – by the 1780s the 
Listers & Curzons also dominated the borough’s 3,000 acres, as 
well as its 102 burgages.156 However, the events of 1780 showed 
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that an alliance between two families only sublimated the political 
tension between ‘influence’ and ‘property’, without resolving it 
under a single owner.
These developments were influenced by general political 
trends. The Revolution of 1688 and ‘first age of party’ undermined 
the Tories’ local monopoly, by weakening their patronage links with 
the Court, the Lord Lieutenancy or the earl of Derby. Adversarial 
Parliamentary politics increased the importance of obscure 
boroughs with easily manipulated franchises such as Clitheroe, and 
the attentions from ambitious newcomers like the Brandons or the 
Harveys. Conversely, as politics became more monopolistic after 
1722 and 1727, Clitheroe could be written off as an irredeemably 
Tory, and incontestably ‘pocket’ borough. The defeat of the Whig 
candidates in 1722 de-coupled Clitheroe from the political centre, 
disconnecting it from alternative patronage networks, and ensuring 
no more interventions by ‘carpet baggers’ such as Monckton & 
Haldane.
The example of Clitheroe does little to dispel the image of 
such boroughs as the most venal and corruptible of constituencies. 
It illustrates Plumb’s growth of political oligarchy based on the 
accumulation of electoral property. At the same time though, it also 
supports O’Gorman and Dickinson’s model, in which procedural 
manipulation and micro-management was essential for political 
success in burgage-boroughs. These trends were accompanied by 
new understandings of the concept of electoral ‘interest’. In the 
43
1690s, ‘interest’ had meant the creation of voting alliances of 
independent burgage owners, by cajoling, bribing, treating, and 
coercing their support. By the 1780s, political ‘interest’ meant the 
ownership of these votes, and the right to command the loyalty of 
the tenants accordingly. Obviously, this reflected a drastic 
narrowing of political power within the borough but this 
‘oligarchic’ control did not develop in a linear fashion, or replace 
unscrupulous partisan manipulation. Despite the gradual 
accumulation of property between 1693 and 1722, a plurality of 
burgages was created only after it became clear that outsiders 
could not simply buy their way into the borough. In addition, as the 
election of 1780 demonstrated, the electorate was only quiescent 
as long as it was denied a choice. In Clitheroe, at least, despite the 
placid appearance of electoral politics in the eighteenth century, 
‘oligarchy’ was a social contract that had constantly to be renewed, 
not the unquestioned ‘divine right’ of an imperturbable ancien 
regime.
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Table 1: Electoral Control of English Burgage Boroughs, c. 1690-c. 
1820:
N. 
Voters
Manoria
l/
c. 1700 c.1660-
1699
c.1700-
1749
c.1750-
1809
Corporate?
Appleby Westmorland 95 CI JI JI C
Ashburton Devon 164 CI JI JI M
Bere Alston Devon <100 JI JI SI M
Bletchingley Surrey <100 JI JI SI M
Boroughbridg
e
Yorkshire <68 CI JI JI M
Bramber Sussex 36 CI JI JI M
Castle Rising Norfolk 60 SI JI SI M
Chippenham Wiltshire <120 CI CI CI C
Clitheroe Lancashire 102 CI JI JI M
Cockermouth Cumberland 260 CI JI SI M
Downton Wiltshire 100 JI JI SI M
East 
Grinstead
Sussex 31 JI JI SI M
Great 
Bedwyn
Wiltshire 118 CI JI SI M
Heytesbury Wiltshire 26 SI SI SI M
Horsham Sussex 69 SI JI SI M
Knaresborou
gh
Yorkshire 90 CI JI SI M
Midhurst Sussex 125 CI JI SI M
Newton Lancashire 104 SI SI SI M
North 
Allerton
Yorkshire 194 JI JI JI M
Old Sarum Wiltshire <20 JI JI SI M
Petersfield Hampshire 154 CI SI SI M
Pontefract Yorkshire 265 CI JI CI C
Richmond Yorkshire 273 CI JI SI C
Ripon Yorkshire 153 JI SI SI C
Thirsk Yorkshire 48 JI JI SI M
Weobley Herefordshire 100 CI JI SI M
Westbury Wiltshire 61 SI SI SI C
Whitchurch Hampshire <80 JI JI SI M
Totals:
Competing Interests 14 1 2
Joint 
Interests
9 22 6
Single Interests 5 5 20
Key:
CI = Competing interests (none predominant)
JI = Joint or shared interests, possessing plurality/majority of 
burgages
SI = Single interest possessing plurality, majority or 
monopoly.
Sources:  
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The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690-1715 eds. E. 
Cruikshanks, S. Handley & D.W. Hayton II, (Cambridge, 2002);
The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690-1715 ed. R. Sedgwick, 
II 
 (1970);
The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1754-1790 eds. Sir L. Namier & J. 
Brooke, I,
(1964).
46
Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Burgage 
Ownership
1693, 1722 & 1780 (N = 
102):
Number of
Burgages
Owned 1693 1722 1780
1 30.4 21.6 3.9
2 33.3 11.8 3.9
3 11.8 11.8 0
4 0 3.9 0
5 0 4.9 4.9
6 0 11.8 0
7 13.7 6.9 6.7
8 0 7.8 0
9 0 0 0
10+ 9.8 20.6 80.4
Note: Calculated by cross-referencing
LRO DDHCl Box 108, ‘General State of the Borough of Clitheroe 
1782...’,
 with borough Rentals 1694-1778 and Enquiry Jury verdicts 1664-
1780
 in Lincs. RO. BNLW Box 1.
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